

The Whitlam Labor Government: Barnard and Whitlam: A Significant Historical Dyad

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Genius does what it must, and Talent does what it can.

“Last Words of a Sensitive Second-Rate Poet”, Owen Meredith, *Lord Lytton 1831-1891*.

Introduction

On 8 February 1967 Gough Whitlam was elected Federal Labor leader with Lance Barnard as his deputy. It was the beginning of a remarkable partnership that was most aptly illustrated by the celebrated duumvirate, “the smallest government ... since the brief Wellington Administration of 1834”,¹ when Whitlam and Barnard assumed government as a two-man ministry in December 1972. It was, however, a close relationship that went back to when they first entered Parliament. “Friendship is a delicate bloom which flourishes only rarely in the jungle of politics”² and the Whitlam-Barnard connection was one that seemed to transcend the usual political “marriage of convenience”, persisting beyond the inevitable tensions, and generating a unique and historically significant alliance, characterised by Kelly as “one of the most successful in recent years in Australian politics”.³

There were a number of significant “partnerships” in Whitlam’s career, “with Cameron in the confrontation with the Victorian Left ... with Freudenberg in the expression of ‘the vision’, with Connor on resources policy”,⁴ yet none persisted like the relationship with Barnard. Whitlam’s characterisation of it is almost fierce.

There was no man to whom I owed so much. He was my first and always my firmest Caucus supporter. No Labor Leader ever had a better deputy or a better friend.⁵

Whitlam’s comments go beyond the usual political platitude. He might well have omitted the entail “or a better friend” without diminishing the generosity of the statement yet it is significant he allows the words to descend into the personal which is unusual in Whitlam’s prose.

In the fascination with a prodigious personality like Whitlam it is easy to overlook the dependence on others and the importance a significant relationship has on the effectiveness of the more public figure. Politics elevates extravagant personalities and dismisses the “spear carriers” but “creative people, apparently alone ... may have intense attachments ... which biographers can overlook”.⁶

In the Barnard and Whitlam connection there is greater political and historical substance than has hitherto been allowed. Commentators have been generous in their assessment of Barnard, acknowledging his role in Whitlam’s rise within the ALP⁷ and suggesting a more significant influence. For despite Barnard’s appearance of shy caution

and diffidence, "he was accustomed to expressing his views forthrightly to Whitlam, and during the period he was Whitlam's deputy he was a restraining influence upon his impulsive and often reckless leader".⁸

Demonstrating where Barnard furthered Whitlam's interests is one thing. Demonstrating Barnard's "restraining influence" is another. The restraining influences on any decision are many and varied, often swallowed up by events and buried in the end result, which is all historians are left to examine. Identifying Barnard's influence is a complex task and one is ultimately left with the impressions of observers that range from the respectful acknowledgment of Kelly and Reid to the dismissive estimation of McClelland, who rejects Barnard as nothing more than a "likeable mediocrity".⁹

The importance of Barnard's relationship with Whitlam, however, may not entirely lie in his impact on particular events. In most walks of life, partnerships or dyads frequently occur that are recognised as particularly fruitful yet to advance acceptable evidence for such an opinion is difficult. What makes these "successful" may not be observable in the outcome so much as within the dynamics of its enactment, by the way it shapes the participants, *by what it makes possible*. All human behaviour takes place within a context that inexorably shapes the decisions and events that flow therefrom: "human acts occur within a network of relationships, processes, and systems that are as ecological as they are cultural".¹⁰

The Concept of Dyad

Bion's analysis of Pairing Group behaviour probably offers the most constructive insight into the dynamics of the dyadic behaviour observable in the Barnard-Whitlam relationship.¹¹ In a Pairing Group, two members overshadow group proceedings and generate an energy and fecundity that the group unconsciously hopes will produce the special idea, insight, emotion — the unborn Messiah — that will "save" the group. The most significant aspect of Bion's analysis of the Pairing Group is its fertility, the enormous creativity and energy generated by the interaction of the two principal participants.

Aside from Bion's analysis, the dynamics of significant partnerships or dyads, to use Simmel's term,¹² has not attracted particular attention by historians, political commentators or even psychologists, despite the fact that "all primal relationships are psychosomatic twosomes".¹³ Significant dyadic relationships, however, frequently occur in all levels of life though only occasionally do commentators touch on their importance. Commenting on the entrepreneurial excesses of the 1980s, Haigh described several significant business dyads of the time that were fruitful and productive until the partnership was broken.

Abe Golberg became erratic when his long-time counsel Arnold Bloch died in 1985, John Spalvins after chairman Joe Winter left Adelaide Steamship, and Russell Goward when he lost the guidance of Ron Brierley.¹⁴

From these illustrations Haigh concludes that "business can dare and win when a big-picture thinker is allied with a countervailing conservative".¹⁵

Haigh has sensed the significance of dyads and the manner in which they frequently present as paired opposites, usually with an extrovert/introvert aspect — Watson and Holmes; Don Quixote and Sancho Panza. The dyad as a paired opposite is an appropriate model that lends itself to the relationship of Barnard and Whitlam — a man who knew his limitations alongside a man with little sense of limitation; the diminutive Barnard and the

immensely tall Whitlam; plebeian and patrician; plain and flamboyant; realist and idealist; pragmatist and visionary.

The reason “opposites” frequently characterise dyadic relationships can be found in the dynamics of displacement and mutual projection. There is a consistent interpretation of pairing phenomena as rooted in mutual projection of disowned parts of ourselves, particularly unworthy or dependent elements of self “each living under the impress of the other's projections”¹⁶ or compensatory elements of strength and weakness that possess “the excellence which the ego lacks in making it an ideal”.¹⁷

Such dyadic relationships are not, though, pathological. Many marriages exhibit complementary features and balancing opposites, the functionality of which depends on the manner in which these opposites are enacted and evolve. Dyads, even same sex dyads, frequently exhibit features akin to “a marriage” of sorts and it is not surprising Bion's analysis of Pairing Groups draws on the analogy of marriage.

The process begins with the twosome, a couple, but spreads to include the whole group. The pair whose interaction is a psychological, talking, enactment of the promise of sexuality, establishes an ambience that is creative, idealistic and visionary, concerned with a social world not yet born.¹⁸

Essentially, the “leader” of this group is a messianic conception, a person or idea yet unborn, but in order to sustain feelings of hope it must *remain* unrealised — “only by remaining a hope does hope persist”.¹⁹ When an actual “leader” is chosen to encapsulate that utopian hope, however, then the dynamics alter radically and the shift is from a Pairing Group to leadership within a Dependency Group, one who

comes with great promise and immediately disappoints. Eventually the feelings that hope was keeping at bay re-emerge and the fresh and promising life of the group becomes spoiled and disillusioned, going quickly from high excitement to deep despair.²⁰

A mercurial personality such as Whitlam's frequently assumes the form of an “inspiring leader” of a Dependency Group wherein followers feel at one with the leader, partners in every new and exciting move of the leader, thriving “on the leader's unpredictability”.²¹

Within Pairing Group dynamics, however, the essential quality of the dyad is its immense fertility;²² the capacity for planning, envisaging, posing alternatives. It generates excitement and creativity with a future orientation that stimulates the inventiveness of the group. This analysis has application to the Whitlam-Barnard dyad, particularly in the period 1967-72, and goes some way to explaining the frequent characterisation of the relationship as “creative” and “fruitful” while remaining vague as to the detailed evidence for such a judgement. Using the dyadic paradigm as a framework places the relationship in context, the substance of which lies in its dynamic, *in what it made possible*, and the evidence for this is largely accessible.

Lance Barnard

Background

Understanding the Whitlam-Barnard dyad requires an understanding of temperament and personality. Much has been written about the personality of Whitlam: the paradoxical arrogance and great compassion, vision and blindness, erudition and naivete.²³ Barnard, on the other hand, has escaped detection, yet there is much in his upbringing and background that is revealing about the relationship with Whitlam.

Lance Barnard was born in Launceston on May Day 1919, the youngest son of Claude Barnard (1890-1957), engine driver, union official and Federal member for Bass from 1934 to 1949.²⁴ His Labor credentials are thus impeccable. In contrast, Whitlam, born in 1916, emanated from a middle class background with a father who attained the rank of Commonwealth Crown Solicitor.²⁵ Lance Barnard was born into Labor politics. Whitlam was born into a liberal ethos of service and administration.

Barnard was twelve years old when his father first stood for Parliament and his formative teenage years were steeped in the minutiae of Labor politics. The 1931 election his father contested and lost placed the family in some financial difficulty and in 1933, aged fourteen, Barnard left school. In 1940 he joined the AIF and served in the Middle East with the 9th Division, 2/8th Field Regiment (Artillery) where he attained the rank of battery sergeant and incurred a life long hearing impairment.

At the end of the war, Barnard furthered his education and became a maths and woodwork teacher on Tasmania's west coast, then a populated mining area with a powerful Labor tradition.²⁶ He was active in both Party and RSL affairs and served as campaign secretary for the popular local state member and later Premier, Eric Reece — the beginning of a long and productive political relationship.²⁷

In 1952 he returned to teach in Launceston and sought endorsement for the Federal seat of Bass. Barnard campaigned vigorously for the seat. He was unashamedly parochial, personally canvassing factories and farms, cultivating the genial, courteous style for which he became renowned. It is a testimony to Barnard's instincts as a campaigner that he was never unseated though over the years Bass was basically a marginal seat.

Barnard's personalised campaigning method and genuine interest in people gave him acute political intuition — he could sense the “numbers” and what people were thinking.²⁸ It was an invaluable skill and Whitlam, who had less awareness of the personality of machine politics, frequently relied on Barnard to indicate tactics and direction. It was a conspicuous talent which was central to Barnard's connection with Whitlam: the complementary aspect of the dyad.

Barnard captured his father's old seat of Bass on 29 May 1954 and entered a Labor Party about to tear itself apart in the “Split” with the conservative “groupers” at the Hobart Federal Conference in March 1955. Barnard, while cautious and conservative, avoided factional alignment and prided himself on alliances that crossed factional boundaries. After all, he married the daughter of a leading Western Australian left wing Senator with the politically unfortunate name of Cant!

Impeccably polite, the strain of trying to listen intently to whatever was said [because of impaired hearing] gave him the appearance of uncertainty and diffidence ... He was liked rather than admired in the Parliamentary Party; his not inconsiderable talents appearing dwarfed alongside those of the more flamboyant Whitlam ... He was a pedestrian speaker, unimaginative in his thinking, reliable in his actions.²⁹

Whitlam, more than most, understood the dimensions of the hearing impairment that plagued Barnard throughout his career. Whitlam's mother, who doted on her exceptional son, was profoundly deaf.

It was his mother's deafness which led to Gough Whitlam's distinctive manner of speaking and his clear articulation. It also accounts for one of his habits which people find a little off-putting ... his way of facing a person directly during conversation. This has sometimes been interpreted as evidence of an over-bearing manner; in fact it is a legacy of living with a near deaf person.³⁰

Because of his mother's disability, Whitlam found hearing impairment quite “natural”, even comforting, and this would have contributed to a particular understanding that helps

explain more about the dynamics of the Whitlam-Barnard relationship than meets the eye (or ear).³¹

Barnard, "much underestimated yet respected"³² was a dedicated parliamentarian, concentrating on his interests, education and defence. While often regarded as prosaic, Barnard attracted sufficient regard by 1967 to be elected deputy leader³³ against eight other contenders, winning against Cairns by only two votes.³⁴ He was to serve as deputy until he was defeated by Cairns on 10 June 1974 though he was to continue as Defence Minister until his resignation (30 May 1975) to take up the position of Ambassador to Sweden. The by-election for Bass, 28 June 1975, which followed his resignation, produced a massive seventeen per cent swing away from the government and is seen as one of the seminal events that preceded the defeat of the Whitlam Government. Barnard played a key role in the ascension of Whitlam through Labor's ranks to the prime ministership and ironically featured indirectly in his demise.

Influences

The most central influence personally and politically on Lance Barnard was his father, Claude, Federal member for Bass (1934-1949) and State member for Bass (1950-1957). He served as Minister for Repatriation in the Chifley Government from 1946-49³⁵ but never held a ministry at state level. Claude Barnard was an unadventurous politician but he was a popular, kindly gentleman, a grass roots politician in a state with a population no bigger than a mainland municipality and exhibiting many local government preoccupations — a "good" parliamentarian was a "roads and bridges"³⁶ member and the "dictum of 'one man, one vote' was occasionally reworded 'one man, one jetty'".³⁷

Cultivating the electorate rather than ideology³⁸ was the principal preoccupation. Barnard's father provided a significant model and Barnard's description of his father could very well have applied to himself.

he was a very level-headed person. He wasn't a man who concerned himself with extremes. He was considered ... a rational person ... who didn't try and press his own point of view without trying to achieve a consensus. In other words he was a moderate man in every respect.³⁹

Barnard's adolescence, a formative period for any person, was shaped by the Depression and Ogilvie's domination of Tasmanian politics so it is not surprising that his political education was dominated by issues of practical concern to people preoccupied with unemployment and survival.

Even people who thought their future was secure could suddenly be faced with a critical situation, socially and economically ... I began to understand ... the problems *could only be resolved by governments*.⁴⁰

These are not the thoughts of a revolutionary but of a man with an accepted faith in governments and their capacity to ameliorate social conditions.

Barnard was obviously close to his father: "It was more than a father and son relationship, it was a relationship between friends",⁴¹ yet it was a relationship founded on their mutual interest in politics and it did not often descend into the intensely personal. Barnard reveals a close and caring family but one that rarely expressed deeply felt emotional responses⁴² which was probably fairly typical of relationships at that time, though that does not entirely explain all the elements of emotional restraint. Dyadic connections are built on a pattern of communication that is not solely verbal — it is based on symbolic exchanges and interpretations that are often stylised yet vital. In any close dyad or "pairing" much of the communication is "hinted". "The participants remain quietly aware of 'distance' ... and from this toying with nearness and distance real

of 'distance' ... and from this toying with nearness and distance real mutuality flows".⁴³ Thus verbal restraint does not necessarily imply a lack of closeness or intimacy.

This aspect of emotionally restrained interaction that characterised Barnard's close relationship with his father, is also reflected in Barnard's interaction with Whitlam. In April 1968 when Whitlam dramatically resigned to re-contest the leadership of the Labor Party, it appeared from the press⁴⁴ that there was suddenly sufficient support for Barnard to assume the Labor leadership. Barnard publicly declined to stand but according to Barnard,⁴⁵ Whitlam never called to check the stories or to seek assurance. Their only discussion was briefly on the evening before the crucial vote when Whitlam obliquely queried Barnard's intentions and received a matter of fact assurance. The implication for both men was crucial yet discussion remained perfunctory. Pride and Whitlam's appreciation of Barnard's loyalty may have prevented more direct discussion, nevertheless it illustrates the unspoken trust and understanding familiar to Barnard within his own family. "Barnard's great political quality was his loyalty: loyalty to his leader, loyalty to his party."⁴⁶

Ideals and Heroes

The influence of Barnard's father instilled in him a pragmatic form of politics, not a politics of ideology. Barnard identifies no particular philosophical influences⁴⁷ and when asked about political ideals, diverted his response to a discussion of social issues, "issues close to the people ... housing, health, education and social welfare".⁴⁸ His response reflects the "weak ideological base"⁴⁹ of the Tasmanian Labor Party at that time and up to the present. The Labor Party familiar to Barnard as he was growing up, frequently flirted with an odd mix of convictions from Douglas Credit to Socialism, depending on the particular vagaries of the ALP Conference of the time, but it was essentially a moderate, pragmatic party, preoccupied with the exercise of power and government, which it experienced very early,⁵⁰ and "dominated by the [Labor] government"⁵¹ and its leaders, like Ogilvie.

Given his political gestation, it is not surprising that Barnard nominates an unusual choice of political "heroes", men like the "studious and courteous"⁵² Norman Makin,⁵³ and Albert Ogilvie,⁵⁴ a man "armed with a razor sharp mind, a choleric temper and a low frustration tolerance".⁵⁵ This is a curious "pairing" of personality opposites, and the reference particularly to Ogilvie, a barrister and political advocate with "inordinate vanity and ambition",⁵⁶ presages Barnard's attraction to the mercurial Whitlam though the choice of Makin has probably more to do with the character of Barnard's father. Nevertheless, Barnard's "heroes" are practical men firmly rooted in mainstream Australian Labor tradition.

Makin⁵⁷ who re-entered Parliament in 1954 after his appointment as Ambassador to Washington became an "elder statesman" of the party; "ever polite"⁵⁸ — like Barnard's father and Barnard himself — and respected for his wise counsel and considerable influence behind the scenes. Whitlam, interestingly, also had a high regard for Makin. Recalling influences on his career, in 1972 Whitlam mentioned Makin with "gratitude and affection" as a man who "couldn't have been more helpful or gracious".⁵⁹

Ogilvie, on the other hand, was a quite different personality and raises interesting comparisons. Albert Ogilvie was elected leader of the Labor Party in Tasmania on 5 October 1929. He lost the 1931 election dismally but won in 1934 gaining for himself the highest personal vote in Tasmanian history.⁶⁰ On his death in 1939 his rule as Premier was described as "one of the most colourful and memorable chapters in the political history of Tasmania".⁶¹ He was "a vigorous and autocratic premier [who] inaugurated a

period of administration that intervened directly and indirectly in the economic and social life of the state.”⁶² Ogilvie

emerged as one of the most dynamic and exciting premiers the state had ever known. He had a flair for the dramatic gesture, which means so much in politics. His promise to abolish high school fees in 24 hours was redeemed to the letter.⁶³

The achievements of his government were impressive. Influenced by the grand vision of Roosevelt's New Deal, Ogilvie gave impetus to the massive Tasmanian hydro-electric programme, secured a newsprint industry, built modern hospitals in Hobart and Launceston and created an extensive employment programme.⁶⁴

With Ogilvie in the saddle, Tasmania ceased to be a sleepy hollow and appeared a hive of activity and not a little experimentation ... he gave the island a sense of direction and removed its 'inferiority complex'.⁶⁵

In one sense Barnard, more than most Australians carried within him, during Labor's frustrating years of Menzies' rule, a clear model and vision of what was possible in government. He carried within him, too, the model of just what kind of person — an Ogilvie, a Whitlam — that could make such a vision possible. It is easy to dismiss the cautious Barnard as without grand imagination but he knew what a good idea looked like. He carried within him a very concrete image of progressive possibility and achievement — a mix of radical and pragmatic social progress. Barnard shared a commitment to Whitlam's imposing programme of reform and he understood just how extensive a change was envisaged, as the following extract from a speech delivered in Perth by Barnard during the 1972 election, indicates. “The early days of the Whitlam Government would rival the 100 days of President Roosevelt in its scope and initiatives.”⁶⁶

Barnard-Whitlam 1954-1972

Whitlam entered Parliament in November 1952, at a by-election, Barnard in the election of 1954, but from the beginning the two became close political colleagues. In the relationship that developed, however, Barnard was never simply a “loyal lieutenant” like Holt to Menzies. Barnard never relied on Whitlam for his position — rather it was the reverse.

In his personal support and regional associations, his ability to call upon old loyalties and established relationships at all levels of the Party, particularly in Tasmania, he was more the lord-lieutenant.⁶⁷

The friendship had its first enactment in 1959. At an Armistice Day ceremony Barnard indicated that Evatt was soon to resign and suggested to Whitlam he consider standing as deputy in expectation of the likely election of Calwell as leader. It was a critical move with critical timing. Barnard's inside information allowed valuable time to muster support since Whitlam was not a natural choice by any means, with several more deserving senior party members like Ward and Harrison, but Barnard

had made the conscious decision ... in 1959 that Whitlam was the man to lead the Labor Party to victory. More than any person except Whitlam himself he made his own prophecy come true. The relationship says much about both men; it is equally creditable to both.⁶⁸

The most significant measure both of the Whitlam-Barnard alliance and of Barnard himself was the decision by Whitlam in 1968 to resign his position and re-contest the leadership. The precipitating event for Whitlam's resignation was the refusal by the

Federal Executive to credential Tasmanian delegate, Brian Harradine, after a defiant statement that “friends of the Communists”⁶⁹ intended preventing his support for an inquiry into the Victorian ALP executive, an enquiry Whitlam was anxious to pursue.

The “impression of intransigence, factionalism and bitterness”⁷⁰ in the Victorian Executive also pervaded the Federal Executive and the meeting of Wednesday, 17 April 1968, began in fiery form. Harradine was interrogated for over a day and a half before the Executive refused his credentials. Whitlam regarded Harradine's comments as “indefensible”⁷¹ but the hostility⁷² to Harradine, whose vote was crucial to control of the Executive, dashed any hope of reform in Victoria, leaving Whitlam “disillusioned and angry”.⁷³

Whitlam resolved to resign and re-contest the parliamentary leadership in order to challenge the Executive and establish the authority of the position, but versions of events leading up to his resignation differ significantly. Freudenberg⁷⁴ claims Whitlam made up his mind on the Thursday evening, after discussion with Barnard, who concurred. Oakes and Solomon also claim Whitlam “consulted Barnard” who “Not only ... failed to dissuade him, but ... [also] ... offered to resign ... in sympathy”,⁷⁵ in effect, encouraging Whitlam.

Barnard, however, claims⁷⁶ that Whitlam only told him he intended to resign as they left for the luncheon adjournment on Friday, the final day of the Executive meeting. Dismayed, Barnard attempted to dissuade him though he knew Whitlam would be difficult to deter. In his view, Whitlam's resignation would not alter the view of the Executive, and, more significantly, ran the risk of fuelling Caucus opposition. Barnard also strenuously denies offering to resign as well. In his view, it would have only needlessly added to an already volatile situation.

Barnard's natural caution and acute political instincts lend some weight to his version. Whitlam's decision to resign was politically dangerous and oddly misdirected. It was an attack on his enemies by proxy — resigning his position in the parliamentary party in order to challenge the Executive of the organisational wing. But whatever version one accepts, events thereafter got a little out of hand. Barnard was perturbed by Whitlam's decision and went to discuss it (though only briefly) with a trusted member of his staff. When the Executive returned from lunch, the afternoon *Sydney Telegraph* proclaimed, “Whitlam Resigns!”. It was not hard to work out where the leak emanated but Whitlam was unconcerned. The die was cast anyway, though it appeared more dramatically orchestrated than in fact was the case.⁷⁷

This construction of the events leading to Whitlam's resignation casts some doubt on Reid's characterisation of Barnard as a “restraining” influence on Whitlam's impetuosity.⁷⁸ It is clear that while Barnard entertained profound doubts about the decision and attempted to dissuade Whitlam, once Whitlam absolutely refused to desist, he saw it as his role to sink his doubts and make it work.

There are occasions when, as a result of our discussions, he altered his decision, although I would not suggest that [it was] a decision about which he himself felt very strongly, I doubt whether I could have altered the decision.⁷⁹

The dynamics of a committed dyad do not necessarily present as a moderation of the behaviour of one partner by the other; it more often involves the preparedness of a partner to stand steadfast even when assailed by doubts. It is a resolve that often makes the impossible possible and it is a measure of Barnard's commitment that he acted as he did.

As Barnard had suspected, Whitlam's decision to resign was to prove dangerous and unpredictable with initial events being quickly overcome by other agendas. The anti-Whitlam forces, grouped about Cairns, became a serious challenge to Whitlam's leadership within Caucus.

A special Caucus meeting was set for 30 April 1968 and while Cairns became the initial focus of moves to unseat Whitlam, there seemed insufficient support, and the pressure shifted on to Barnard. Cairns announced he would stand aside and support Barnard⁸⁰ but Barnard declined the offer. He would not oppose Whitlam “under any circumstances”.⁸¹ The pressure on him, however, was intense and it became abundantly clear⁸² Barnard “could have become leader, there is no question ... I had the numbers”.⁸³ Barnard's confidence seems well founded, given the uncomfortably close result — Cairns 32, Whitlam 38.

Barnard's decision not to stand merits consideration. The offer to lead Labor and possibly become prime minister was extraordinarily tempting as Barnard admits⁸⁴ but he had a number of cogent reasons for refusing to stand. He believed strongly that Whitlam was the appropriate person to lead Labor to power and considered that Whitlam had not had the opportunity to demonstrate his abilities. Barnard also knew his own shortcomings and was satisfied to play a subordinate role that demonstrated his *strengths*, not weaknesses. As he said at the time of his election to the position of deputy: “The party does not need star quality in its deputy if the price it would have to pay for it is division in the leadership”.⁸⁵ For a politician of normal ambition this shows unusual modesty and willingness to subordinate himself to the interests of the group, a quality that does not necessarily engender respect in the robust world of politics.

The decision was not simple modesty, however. Barnard was a political realist. He knew that if he accepted Cairns's offer and won the leadership he would remain beholden to the Left, a captive, with “dues” to be paid, and he knew — with Whitlam out of the way and with no other possible contender — that if he faltered as leader, Cairns would undoubtedly unseat him. Barnard knew himself and his limitations. He once said, “If I'd begun with regarding myself as an outstanding personality I don't think I'd have achieved what I have.”⁸⁶ He had insight and sagacity, rare gifts in a politician. He possessed wisdom and simple humanity, qualities which, along with his practicality, made Barnard invaluable to Whitlam.

Barnard-Whitlam 1972-1974

Metaphors That Come To Life

There is a tendency with any emotionally significant motif (like the dyad), for the metaphor to reify or “concretise” and intrude into conscious life. This tendency often assumes the shape of an apparently unrelated joke, a pun or a “play on words”, that some times acts like a parody of the essential psychological fact. For example, when Whitlam describes the secrecy surrounding the decision to appoint John Kerr as Governor-General in 1973, he jokes on the theme of marriage with acknowledgement of Barnard as sole confidant, an unintentional allusion to the nature of their relationship.

I was reminded of the remark made to King William III by the first Duke of Marlborough about some highly secret military operation: 'Sire, I have told only my wife.' To which the King replied: 'I have not even told my wife' (who ... happened to be the Queen of England ...). Because of the necessity to keep the situation confidential, I discussed it with only one other person, Mr Barnard.⁸⁷

Dyads contain elements analogous to marriage and the fact that such an emotionally entrenched metaphor assumes a “recognisable” form merely demonstrates the authority of an internal symbolic world; that it occasionally spills over into the conscious world should not be surprising.

In the Barnard-Whitlam dyad the most significant “concretisation” of the dyadic motif was formation of the first Whitlam Government — what became known as the “duumvirate” — a government solely constituted by Barnard and Whitlam, lasting from 5-19 December 1972. For Whitlam there were “pressing” policy reasons for the speedy formation of such a ministry but irrespective of the urgency in his mind, the solution was extraordinary “[a] government of two men administering 27 Departments of State sounds like a phantasmagoria, an hallucination to be found only in a mythical polity”.⁸⁸ Whitlam’s urgency probably had more to do with the fact that he “did not want the momentum generated by the election result, lost”⁸⁹ and this set the tenor of his government, forging an urgency that infected his later ministry and which became difficult to control over time. But for thirteen days the country stood to attention. Each day the *Australian* ran on the front page, “What the Government Did Today”, a blow-by-blow list of decisions made by Whitlam and Barnard. The nation became embroiled in the excitement of a Pairing Group in which these two enacted the group fantasy of a coming age! “For thirteen days of the duumvirate, Australia was governed not by two men, but by the Whitlam doctrine of the mandate. The duumvirate was the apotheosis of the mandate.”⁹⁰

The concept of “mandate” is important in the context of Bion’s Pairing Group analysis. The key element of the Pairing Group is the messianic promise of things to come — an “unborn leader” which may be a personified “saviour” or an idea or a “mandate” to change the future radically. For Freudenberg, Whitlam’s speech writer and articulator, to describe the duumvirate as the “apotheosis of the mandate” is insightful. Even the choice of the term “apotheosis” (from the Greek for “deification”) is extremely apt, though to be strictly accurate, it was the mandate that was the apotheosis of the duumvirate rather than the reverse. But then it could be argued Whitlam occasionally had difficulty in identifying where the messianic elements properly resided.⁹¹

In Government

The most significant aspect of the ascendancy of Labor and the startling sweep of power exercised by the duumvirate was the way it elevated both doubts and expectations. It generated in the full Whitlam ministry an enthusiasm that often outranked its capacity and encouraged some to “become *prima donnas*”.⁹² Whitlam’s response to this accusation is telling. “I don’t care how many *prima donnas* there are in the Labor Party as long as I’m the *prima donna absoluta*.”⁹³ It is a lively retort but dangerously cavalier. Humour, as suggested earlier, frequently acts to reify or “concretise” an internal metaphor and the inference to be drawn from Whitlam’s remark is of a government more intent on the dramatic flourish than disciplined focus.

The dynamics of the Barnard-Whitlam dyad reached its apogee with the formation of the duumvirate and the position of Barnard as a potential modifier of excess declined after the election of the full ministry though Barnard maintains that the relationship remained close and that Whitlam usually consulted him on matters of major policy.⁹⁴ In Bion’s Pairing Group, the focus is on the hope of *future* possibility. With *attainment* — in this case, of government — the group dynamics descend into the *present* and the special energy generated from such a dyad dissipates. Group dynamics then moves into dependency mode and reliance on the inspirational leader who dramatically elevates expectation and inevitably disappoints, or shifts towards a Fight-Flight mode, the “normal” structure of a political group,⁹⁵ wherein factional leaders emerge to challenge the entrenched leadership.

Barnard's support had been critical for Whitlam in the attainment of office, but "all this changed in government. The man who had been indispensable once now appeared readily dispensable."⁹⁶ This shift in the relationship brought about by the assumption of power may explain the doubtful observation of one commentator that while, during the first seventeen months, "Lance Barnard was certainly Deputy Leader ... he was never as significant in terms of Cabinet policy or Caucus management as [Cairns and Crean]".⁹⁷

Whittington underestimates Barnard's unobtrusive influence, his care to avoid controversy, and his role in the relatively benign portfolio of Defence,⁹⁸ nevertheless Bion's analysis would lead one to expect a perceptible diminution in Barnard's influence and importance after the assumption of office. The degree to which Barnard had ceased to be central to Whitlam's purposes can be seen in Whitlam's response to the announcement of Cairn's candidature for the position of deputy in June 1974. Whitlam had appeared to stand behind Barnard during the 1974 election campaign⁹⁹ but seemed uncommitted when it came to the vote. Barnard asked for Whitlam's support and gave him a list to lobby¹⁰⁰ but apart from a "few semi-public gestures"¹⁰¹ he did little about it and was even reported as claiming he was neutral on the issue.¹⁰² Whitlam's active support would have undoubtedly buttressed Barnard's vote in the ballot so defeat for the deputy leadership was a bitter blow for Barnard. "He gave Whitlam unflinching loyalty, a loyalty which he ingenuously expected to be returned, but which he found was absent when the chips were down."¹⁰³ More than a personal blow to Barnard, the defeat meant the

duumvirate was broken, not just the fleeting duumvirate of 5-18 [sic] December 1972 but also the Whitlam-Barnard partnership that had steered the Labor Party to power through seven tumultuous years.¹⁰⁴

The relationship continued, however, in a diminished form. Barnard is a forgiving person and as he is quick to point out, Whitlam largely ignored Cairns and continued to discuss decisions and to seek his advice even after Cairn's election.¹⁰⁵ The capacity Barnard had when deputy to influence decisions, however, seemed to be waning.

Whitlam had relied on Barnard as a sounding board and Barnard was capable of standing up to Whitlam in a way few others were able to or dared. While Barnard was still deputy, and shortly after Whitlam had made the controversial decision (April 1974) to appoint Gair as Ambassador to Ireland, Whitlam confided to Barnard that he intended to appoint Bert James as Administrator of Norfolk Island. Barnard, starkly aware of the political ramifications, was utterly appalled,¹⁰⁶ given the public uproar over the Gair appointment. There seemed absolutely no gain to be made, though Whitlam hinted at a suitable candidate for James' seat (thought to be Whitlam's son, Tony). Whitlam accepted Barnard's advice against the appointment but after Barnard left Parliament, Whitlam resurrected the proposal and walked into the controversy Barnard had predicted.

The partnership was not as it was, however, and there were even suggestions of conflict. The July 1973 a decision was taken to slash tariffs by twenty-five per cent,¹⁰⁷ a decision that had continuing implications for relations between the two men. In a speech in September 1974 Whitlam poured scorn on an assessment (publicised by Barnard) of threatened unemployment resulting from the tariff decision and added he had "nothing but contempt for those who accept and peddle lies ... my own colleagues ... among them".¹⁰⁸

There was some plain talking. Barnard told Whitlam he had never wavered in his loyalty ... [and] ... he was entitled at least to the courtesy of being consulted before Whitlam 'tipped the bucket' on him wrongly.¹⁰⁹

There were other reports of clashes with Barnard.¹¹⁰ On 16 May 1975 Whitlam was asked by Right activist, Michael Darby¹¹¹ to allow a medical team to join an RAAF flight next morning to pick up Vietnamese refugees. Whitlam refused but Darby approached

Barnard, claiming prime ministerial consent. Given the immediacy of the issue, approval was given. When Whitlam heard, he is reported to have been abusive in the extreme and called Barnard to vent his anger. Barnard paints a less extreme picture of the clash and while acknowledging Whitlam's rage, says his telling response to the PM was to ask how he would have responded had he refused Darby, and Darby actually had the PM's approval. The annoyance would no doubt have been equally vociferous.

Whether it is true or not that Whitlam had suggested of Barnard regarding the incident, "That's it, he's had it",¹¹² it is certainly true that ten days later on 26 May 1975, the two men discussed Barnard's appointment as Ambassador to Sweden. For Whitlam it was unfortunate the opportunity to make another appointment was no longer available. Whitlam had asked Governor-General Sir Paul Hasluck to advise on his replacement and the list he supplied included the names of Ken Myer, John Kerr and Lance Barnard. When Myer declined,¹¹³ Whitlam discussed the appointment of Kerr with Barnard. Whitlam made it clear, if Kerr refused, Barnard would have to accept the appointment.¹¹⁴ Whitlam would have undoubtedly appointed Barnard had he expressed any interest and had it arisen later, Barnard may well have considered it and been afforded the opportunity, once more, of serving the interests of his leader. Unfortunately for Whitlam that was not to be.

Conclusion

The importance of Barnard has been examined primarily in terms of his contribution to the partnership with Whitlam — a significant dyad exhibiting many of the features of Bion's Pairing Group. Barnard was not a simple subordinate. He contributed significantly to the partnership with Whitlam by reading the mood of the electorate, of Caucus and the party machine, and guiding Whitlam's decisions accordingly. More than that, he shared Whitlam's vision of change and committed himself sedulously to its implementation. The two men stood much in contrast to one another, in size, in personality, in nature and outlook, yet they complemented one another in a way that enhanced their effectiveness beyond the simple sum of their energies. Whitlam owes much to Barnard: for his loyalty and support; for his counsel and common sense; for his sagacity and practical knowledge. He owes Barnard much for his rise in the party ranks, and more importantly, owes him much for *remaining* there.

The concept of a significant dyad provides an analytic framework that establishes *expectations* about the dynamics of a dyad that can then be placed against the evidence. The nature of Bion's Pairing Group, with its focus on the saving hope of things to come, provides an explanation for the intensity of the relationship between Barnard and Whitlam prior to the election to government in 1972, its peak in creativity and effectiveness at the time of the duumvirate, and its diminution thereafter. Furthermore while many events supervened to erode the Whitlam Government after Barnard's defeat as Deputy Prime Minister, the expectations that flow from this analysis indicate that Whitlam was probably more affected by the departure of his trusted colleague than external appearances would suggest. The demise of the Labor Government may have been hastened by Barnard's departure; if not in other ways, then certainly by the by-election result in Bass.

Some commentators like Reid, the experienced journalist/observer and Freudenberg, Whitlam's word-smith, have been generous in their regard for Barnard's contribution, others like McClelland, less so. He was the ideal lieutenant — he was ambitious, but willing to assume a subordinate role. He was a practical, unassuming person of considerable experience and natural wisdom. More than anything, he was a man who

knew himself and his limitations — and achieved more with those limitations than most men of more supposed “brilliance”. Those are rare qualities in any person.

A personality as potent as Whitlam’s satisfies a yearning for heroes, for figures that inspire, for ideas that generate hope. It is such qualities that makes the period of the Whitlam Government so fascinating. “Other governments may have been more successful, but have not been so interesting, which is what history ultimately requires.”¹¹⁵ It was a period of potent imagery, of roller-coaster personalities and towering ideals scuttled by what were seen as the bleak forces of convention. But behind these grandiose images were men like Barnard who toiled to reveal a vision of society transformed. Without such men the dreams that sprang to life in 1972 would never have seen the light of day.

NOTES

- 1 E. G. Whitlam, *The Whitlam Government 1972-1975* (Melbourne: Penguin, 1985), p. 18. It should be noted that Wellington formed his brief ministry after the dismissal of Lord Melbourne by William IV, the last such dismissal by the Crown of a government with authority over Australia until that of the Whitlam Government in 1975. Whitlam’s seizing of this historical incident has a perverse irony — the events of the Wellington Ministry happened in reverse order to those of the Whitlam Government!
- 2 A. Reid, *The Whitlam Venture* (Melbourne: Hill of Content, 1976), p. 5.
- 3 P. Kelly, *The Unmaking of Gough* (Sydney: Angus & Robinson, 1976), p. 178.
- 4 J. Walter, *The Leader* (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1980), p. 235.
- 5 E. G. Whitlam, *The Truth of the Matter* (Melbourne: Penguin, 1979), p. 61.
- 6 G. Little, *Political Ensembles: A Psychosocial Approach to Politics and Leadership* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 93.
- 7 Reid, *The Whitlam Venture*, p. 51.
- 8 *Ibid.*
- 9 J. McClelland, *Stirring the Possum: A Political Autobiography* (Melbourne: Penguin, 1989), p. 138.
- 10 Wm. Cronon, “A Place for Stories: Nature, History, and Narrative”, *Journal of American History* 78, 4 (March 1992), p. 1349. Cronon uses “ecology” in the scientific sense but it remains valid used here in a metaphorical sense.
- 11 W. R. Bion, *Experiences in Groups* (London: Tavistock, 1961).
- 12 Georg Simmel, *On Individuality and Social Forms*, edited by D. N. Levine (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1971); K. Wolff, *The Sociology of Georg Simmel* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1950).
- 13 T. Main, “A Theory of Marriage and its Technical Applications”, in Jennifer Johns, ed., *The Ailment and Other Psychoanalytic Essays by Tom Main* (London: Free Association Books, 1989), p. 93.
- 14 G. Haigh, “Barons of Bankruptcy”, *Australian* 17-18 September 1994, p. 4. This article is a review of Trevor Sykes’ *The Bold Riders: Behind Australia’s Corporate Collapses* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1994).
- 15 *Ibid.*
- 16 Main, “A Theory of Marriage and its Technical Applications”, p. 81.
- 17 S. Freud, *On Narcissism: An Introduction* (1914) (Standard Edition XIV), p. 101.
- 18 Little, *Political Ensembles*, p. 88.

- 19 Bion, *Experiences in Groups*, p. 152.
- 20 Little, *Political Ensembles*, p. 88.
- 21 *Ibid.*, p. 89.
- 22 It is dangerous to overly psychologise, though it is worth noting that because of severe illness while in the Middle East Barnard was unable to have children of his own. It is testimony to his humanitarian inclinations that he adopted a number of children including a Vietnamese orphan. It is obvious that a loss of this nature would create mourning in any man and it is reasonable to assume that he displaced part of that emotion into the partnership with Whitlam. Bion's characterisation of the immense fertility of such enacted relationships is given added significance by difficulties experienced by Barnard in his personal life.
- 23 Walter, *The Leader*; Reid, *The Whitlam Venture*; F. Daly, *From Curtin to Kerr* (Melbourne: Sun Books, 1977); Kelly, *The Unmaking of Gough*; G. Freudenberg, *A Certain Grandeur: Gough Whitlam in Politics* (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1977).
- 24 J. Rydon, *A Biographical Register of the Commonwealth Parliament 1901-1972* (Canberra: ANU Press, 1975), p. 11.
- 25 Walter, *The Leader*, p. 200.
- 26 P. Weller, "Tasmania", in P. Loveday, A. W. Martin, and R. S. Parker, eds, *The Emergence of the Australian Party System* (Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 1977), pp. 362-64. The West Coast gave to politics such notables as King O'Malley and Eric Reece.
- 27 *Parliament's Bicentenary Oral History Project*, Interview of The Hon. Lance Barnard AO by Ron Hurst and Brenda McAvoy July 1983-March 1987 (Canberra: Australian Parliamentary Library), used with permission, p. 1: 20. It was Reece who lobbied strenuously, but unsuccessfully, on Barnard's behalf during the ballot for deputy leader in 1974 against Cairns.
- 28 Barnard had a phenomenal memory for people and a capacity to recall names, faces and place in society. It was a politician's gift but it came from his essential liking for people. Even today, twenty years after his retirement from politics, Barnard continues to work quietly in the community attending to individual concerns and community issues.
- 29 Reid, *The Whitlam Venture*, p. 51.
- 30 L. Oakes, *Whitlam PM* (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1973), p. 3.
- 31 It is interesting to note also, given the dyadic paradigm employed, that in speeches and broadcasts Barnard unconsciously assumed characteristic Whitlam pauses and intonation, particularly when in government.
- 32 Reid, *The Whitlam Venture*, p. 51.
- 33 The position of deputy is often undervalued yet may present difficulties for a party; an ambitious aspirant (like Keating) may use it to destabilise a leader and a colourless occupant may make the position redundant. A balance is difficult, though Barnard as deputy to Whitlam and Frank Forde as deputy to Curtin come closest.
- 34 R. McMullin, *The Light on the Hill: The Australian Labor Party 1891-1991* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 316.
- 35 Rydon, *A Biographical Register of the Commonwealth Parliament 1901-1972*, p. 11.
- 36 Weller, "Tasmania", p. 357.
- 37 *Ibid.*, p. 357. Because the significant pome fruit industry relied on river transport to shift the apple crop.
- 38 The lack of ideological fervour in Tasmanian politics is well illustrated by the young parliamentarian (now a long serving state Labor politician) who attended a branch meeting where he heard much mention of a certain Trotsky and his followers. Earnest and ever conscious of the need to cultivate branch members and persons of influence, he asked innocently for Trotsky's address so he could visit at the earliest opportunity. The Labor member in question tells the story against himself but without his permission I will leave him unnamed!
- 39 *Parliament's Bicentenary Oral History Project*, p. 1: 4.
- 40 *Ibid.*, p. 1: 3; emphasis added.
- 41 *Ibid.*, p. 1: 4.
- 42 Even the death of his older brother, Jack, in New Guinea, which obviously affected his parents, was never verbalised. *Ibid.*, p. 1: 17.
- 43 Little, *Political Ensembles*, p. 28 in discussing Simmel.

- 44 *Australian*, Monday, 22 April 1968, article by Alan Ramsey.
- 45 Personal interview.
- 46 Kelly, *The Unmaking of Gough*, p. 178.
- 47 In his Oral History Project interview Barnard mentions only one influential book, one given to him by his father at the time of his election called *The War Aims of a Plain Australian* (which he incorrectly calls *War Aims of a Great Australian*). It was by C. E. W. Bean, the war historian, whose mother was a Tasmanian. Published in 1943, Bean deplored "the failure of [the] people to enact the ideals for which WWI had been fought. As in his tract of 1918 [Bean's] answer was 'Educate, and Educate!'", *Australian Dictionary of Biography* Vol. 3 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1979), p. 229.
- 48 *Parliament's Bicentenary Oral History Project*, p. 2: 4.
- 49 N. Batt, "Tasmanian Labor Party Conferences 1930-1935", *Tasmanian Historical Research Association: Papers and Proceedings* 26, 1 (1979), p. 13. Labor has generally been more welfarist and pragmatic than ideological, and what ideological fervour was exhibited tended to be more pronounced in the metropolitan centres than in the peripheral states like Tasmania.
- 50 Labor briefly held office under Earle in 1909 and again from 1914-16. Its first leaders, Earle and Lyons defected to the conservatives (Earle over Conscription and Lyons over Theodore's management of fiscal policy under Scullin).
- 51 Batt, "Tasmanian Labor Party Conferences 1930-1935", p. 4.
- 52 McMullin, *The Light on the Hill*, p. 131.
- 53 *Parliament's Bicentenary Oral History Project*, p. 8: 14.
- 54 *Ibid.*, p. 8: 9.
- 55 R. Davis, *Eighty Years' Labor: 1903-1983* (Hobart: Sassafras Books and University of Tasmania History Department, 1983), p. 11.
- 56 M. Denholm, "Record of A G Ogilvie in the Lyons Tasmanian Labor Government, 1923-1928", *Tasmanian Historical Research Association: Papers and Proceedings* 25, 2 (1978), p. 41.
- 57 Speaker (1929-1931) during the Scullin Government and Minister for Navy and Munitions (1941-1943) and Minister for Aircraft Production (1943-1946) in the Curtin Government before taking up the position of first Australian Ambassador to the USA (1946-1951). He had been a respected member of the inner War Cabinet and an effective Minister in charge of Munitions, sufficiently respected that on the death of Curtin, Makin was encouraged to nominate unsuccessfully for the leadership against Forde and Chifley. He was also Caucus secretary in the 1930s and Weller, *Caucus Minutes 1901-1949*, praises his care and regard for the historical importance of his task. Biographical material from *Who's Who 1955* and from McMullin, *The Light on the Hill*.
- 58 McMullin, *The Light on the Hill*, p. 162.
- 59 *Australian Financial Review*, 30 May 1972.
- 60 Denholm, "Record of A G Ogilvie in the Lyons Tasmanian Labor Government, 1923-1928", p. 38.
- 61 *Ibid.*, p. 38.
- 62 W. A. Townsley, *The Government of Tasmania* (St Lucia: Queensland University Press, 1976), p. 8.
- 63 Davis, *Eighty Years' Labor: 1903-1983*, p. 32.
- 64 F. C. Green, *A Century of Responsible Government 1856-1956* (Hobart: Government Printer, Tasmania, n. d.), p. 234.
- 65 Davis, *Eighty Years' Labor: 1903-1983*, p. 32.
- 66 *Parliament's Bicentenary Oral History Project*, p. 3: 7.
- 67 Freudenberg, *A Certain Grandeur*, p. 87.
- 68 *Ibid.*, p. 87.
- 69 McMullin, *The Light on the Hill*, p. 320.
- 70 *Ibid.*, p. 321 quoting from Whitlam's letter to Caucus members outlining his reasons for resignation.
- 71 *Ibid.*

- 72 Barnard claims that the level of hostility from some Executive members was such that he genuinely feared physical violence.
- 73 McMullin, *The Light on the Hill*, p. 321.
- 74 Freudenberg, *A Certain Grandeur*, p. 132.
- 75 L. Oakes and D. Solomon, *The Making of an Australian Prime Minister* (Melbourne: Cheshire 1973), p. 17.
- 76 Personal interview.
- 77 Personal interview; the staff member later admitted a more than modest fee was paid for the story!
- 78 Reid, *The Whitlam Venture*, p. 51.
- 79 *Parliament's Bicentenary Oral History Project*, p. 6: 5. The poor syntax is a result of a tape transcript.
- 80 McMullin, *The Light on the Hill*, p. 322; *Parliament's Bicentenary Oral History Project*, 6: 12; *Australian*, 22 April 1968.
- 81 *Australian*, 22 April 1968, front page article by Alan Ramsey.
- 82 McMullin, *The Light on the Hill*, p. 322.
- 83 *Parliament's Bicentenary Oral History Project*, pp. 6: 13. It is difficult to confirm Barnard's opinion, since he never attempted to test his support; however the reality was that on the Cairns/Whitlam vote, Barnard only required his own and three other votes to have won. As Freudenberg, *A Certain Grandeur*, p. 87, points out, Barnard had a considerable personal power base and Whitlam relied almost entirely on Barnard and Connor to muster support.
- 84 Personal interview.
- 85 Oakes and Solomon, *The Making of an Australian Prime Minister*, p. 13.
- 86 D. Whittington, *The Witless Men* (Melbourne: Sun Books, 1975), p. 62.
- 87 Whitlam, *Truth of the Matter*, p. 25.
- 88 C. L. Lloyd and G. S. Reid, *Out of the Wilderness: The Return of Labor* (Melbourne: Cassell, 1974), p. 14. Lloyd was Barnard's senior adviser though he resigned on entering government. Despite his cautionary comments about precedents there is no doubt in his book that he, like others, was dazzled by the concept and audacity of the duumvirate.
- 89 Whitlam, *The Whitlam Government*, p. 14.
- 90 Freudenberg, *A Certain Grandeur*, p. 245.
- 91 Even when the Kingdom has Come, however, it still has to be administered. "The City of God is built like other cities:/ Judas negotiates the loans you float;/ You will meet Caiaphas upon committees;/ You will be glad of Pilate's casting vote." A. D. Hope, "Easter Hymn". A. D. Hope, *Selected Poems*, edited by David Brooks (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1992), p. 4.
- 92 Freudenberg, *A Certain Grandeur*, p. 249.
- 93 *Ibid.*, p. 249.
- 94 With notable exceptions like the twenty-five per cent Tariff Cuts and the Loans Affair.
- 95 The success of Labor 1983-1996 was in part due to the fact it has institutionalised and formalised the factional elements of the Fight-Flight mode — that is transformed it into ritual.
- 96 Kelly, *The Unmaking of Gough*, p. 178.
- 97 Whittington, *The Witless Men*, p. 86. Whittington seems to assume publicity equals influence.
- 98 Whitlam and Barnard had agreed in 1967 respectively to assume responsibility for Foreign Affairs and Defence, the areas that had caused Labor electoral difficulty. Barnard's job was to make Defence uncontroversial in which he clearly succeeded. His efforts in Defence, however, and the reforms he instituted were substantial. See C. Lloyd, "Self De ... fence: Labor's Long Shadow", in H. Emy, O. Hughes, and R. Mathews, eds, *Whitlam Re-visited: Policy Development, Policies and Outcomes* (Sydney: Pluto Press, 1993). Lloyd was Barnard's senior adviser.
- 99 Whitlam election speech Perth, 4 May 1974, cited in Reid, *The Whitlam Venture*, p. 121.
- 100 *Ibid.*, p. 123.
- 101 L. Oakes and D. Solomon, *Grab for Power: Election '74* (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1974), p. 526.
- 102 Reid, *The Whitlam Venture*, p. 124.
- 103 *Ibid.*, p. 51.
- 104 Freudenberg, *A Certain Grandeur*, p. 304. The duumvirate was from 5-19 December 1972.

- 105 Personal interview.
- 106 Reid, *The Whitlam Venture*, p. 200. Barnard confirmed this in a personal interview.
- 107 F. H. Gruen, "The 25% Tariff Cut: Was it a Mistake?", *Australian Quarterly* 47, 2 (June 1975), pp. 7-19 *passim*. Enormous blame for job losses was heaped on the tariff cuts though Gruen points out that currency fluctuations largely eroded the effect of the tariff cuts and the causes of spiralling unemployment rested elsewhere in global economic changes and the emergence of "stagflation", countering the then orthodox Keynesian analysis.
- 108 Reid, *The Whitlam Venture*, p. 124.
- 109 *Ibid.*, p. 124.
- 110 Kelly, *The Unmaking of Gough*, pp. 178-9. Barnard claims, however, except for the Darby matter, he and Whitlam never argued. Barnard is emphatic that with him, Whitlam never got "nasty" — "never did" (personal interview).
- 111 He had stood against Whitlam in Werriwa in 1974 which did not ingratiate him with the PM.
- 112 Kelly, *The Unmaking of Gough*, p. 179.
- 113 Commentators do not give the reasons; it would appear that the primary reason for Myer's refusal was the fact that his wife was Japanese and he feared the controversy and racism that would have accompanied the appointment.
- 114 *Parliament's Bicentenary Oral History Project*, p. 7: 1.
- 115 O. Hughes, "That Was a Time", in Emy, Hughes, and Mathews, eds, *Whitlam Re-visited*, p. 253.